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Abstract: In this paper, general logic-systems are investigated. It is
shown that there are infinitely many finite consequence operators defined
on a fixed language L that cannot be generated from any finite logic-
system. It is shown that any set map C:P(L) → P(L) is a finite
consequence operator if and only if it is defined by a general logic-system.
1. Introduction.
Usually, two types of consequential operators are investigated, the general and
the finite (finitary, algebraic). In this paper, since the objects will not be embedded
formally into a nonstandard structure, roman font will not be used for the informal
mathematical symbols. Let L be a nonempty language, P be the power set operator
and F the finite power set operator. For a nonempty language L, when a general
logic-system or a consequence operator is said to be defined on L this means that
they are defined on P(L).
Definition 1.1. Amapping C:P(L)→ P(L) is a general consequence operator
(or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L)
(i) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L; and if
(ii) X ⊂ Y , then C(X) ⊂ C(Y ).
A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finite (finitary, or algebraic) if
it satisfies
(iii) C(X) =
⋃
{C(A) | A ∈ F(X)}.
Remark 1.2. The above axioms (i), (ii), (iii) are not independent. Indeed,
(i), (iii) imply (ii). Hence, the finite consequence operators defined on a specific
language form a subset of the general operators.
In (Herrmann, 2001), Section 3, logic-systems for a nonempty language are de-
fined by means of a nonempty finite collection of n-ary relationsRI = {R1, . . . , Rk},
the rules of inference, where each Ri ⊂ L
n, n ≥ 1. The set RI includes a possibly
nonempty set R1, (defined as a unary relations, where (a) = a), and using this
set along with an informally described algorithm deductions are obtain for each
X ∈ P(L). It is shown there that each such logic-system generates a finite con-
sequence operator C that yields the same deductions when C is applied to any
X ∈ P(L). Since there are but finitely many rules of inference, define such a logic-
system as a finite logic-system and the set of rules RI as the finite rules of inference.
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If RI is a finite or infinite set of n-ary relations, then RI is called the general rules
of inference and the logic-system that uses such a RI is called a general logic-
system. The symbol RI also denotes the logic-system with its defined processes.
As shown in the same manner as for a finite logic-system (Herrmann, 2001), any
nonempty general logic-system RI generates (defines) a finite consequence operator
the consequences of which are the same as those obtained from RI.
2. General logic-systems.
In general, for any n ≥ 1, Rn denotes a nonempty subset of Ln. I note that
the notion of “effectiveness” used in Herrmann (2001) can be removed and replaced
with either choice or simple conditional statements.
For any consequence operator C generated by a logic-system RI, a Rn ∈ RI
applies trivially to X ⊂ L if using the algorithm described in Herrmann (2001)
restricted to Rn for members of X , there is no a ∈ L such that a /∈ X ∪ C(∅). For
any X ⊂ L, R1 applies trivially to X since R1 ⊂ C(∅). Also, if Rn applies trivially
to X ⊂ L, then Rn applies trivially to each Y ⊂ X.
Consider the natural numbers IN and a nonempty language LN each member
of which denotes a member of IN. In what follows, the defined standard symbolic
forms for members of IN are used. For LN , let S
f
N be the set of all finite rules of
inference as defined on LN and SN the set of all general rules of inference defined
on LN . In all that follows, the superscript denotes the “arity” of a relation.
Definition 2.1. The set RI = {Rn | 0 < n ∈ IN} is defined by induction.
(1) (n = 1), R1 = ∅.
(2) (n > 1), Rn = {(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)}, where ai =
n2−n−4
2
+i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Theorem 2.2. If C is the finite consequence operator defined on LN by the
infinite general logic-system RI, then there does not exist RI1 ∈ S
f
N such that for,
C1, its generated consequence operator, C1 = C.
Proof. Let RI1 ∈ S
f
N , C1 be the finite consequence operator generated by
RI1 and C1 = C. For such a C1, C1(∅) = C(∅) = ∅ (i.e. all unary relations are
empty.) Since RI1 ∈ S
f
N and C1({0}) = {0, 1}, then RI1 contains a nonempty
p-ary relation, where p ≥ 2 is the maximum arity for all of the members of RI1.
Let k > p and X = {ai | (ai =
k2−k−4
2
+ i) ∧ (i ∈ IN) ∧ (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1)}. Then
C1(X) = C(X) = {ai | (ai =
k2−k−4
2
+ i) ∧ (i ∈ IN) ∧ (1 ≤ i ≤ k)}. From the
definition of C, since no member of X appears as any coordinate in any Rn ∈ RI,
where n 6= k and for n = k they all appear as distinct coordinates, then for each
Y ⊂ X such that |Y | = k − 2, if follows that for n ≥ 1, that Rn applies trivially to
Y . However, for such Y , C1(Y ) = C(Y ) = Y. Hence, for every n ≥ 1, R
n ∈ RI1
applies trivially to such Y . Thus, since X ⊂ C1(X) = C(X) 6= X, then there exists
one or more Rq, q ≥ k, that uses all members of X as coordinates and yields a
finite step deduction that C1(X) = {ai | (ai =
k2−k−4
2
+ i)∧ (i ∈ IN)∧ (1 ≤ i ≤ k)}.
This contradicts the definition of p and the result follows.
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Corollary 2.2.1. There are infinitely many finite consequence operators that
cannot be generated by a finite logic-system.
Proof. Simply change definition 2.1. For each m ∈ IN, (1) (n = 1), R1m = ∅.
(2) (n > 1), Rnm = {(a1, . . . , ai)}, ai = m+
n2−n−4
2
+ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let C be a general consequence operator defined on L. Define C(∅) = R1.
Next, for each ∅ 6= X ∈ F(L), let |X | = n. Then consider a finite choice (i.e. finite
sequence) X = {x1, . . . , xn}. Define the corresponding (n+1)-ary relation R
n+1
X (C)
as follows: If C(X) 6= X ∪ R1, let {(x1, . . . , xn, y) | y ∈ C(X) − (X ∪ R
1)} and ∅
otherwise. Let, for each n ≥ 1, n ∈ N, Rn+1F (C) =
⋃
{Rn+1X (C) | (|X | = n) ∧ (X ∈
F(L))}. Then let RI∗ = {R1} ∪ {Rn+1F (C) | (n ≥ 1) ∧ (n ∈ N)}. Obviously, RI
∗
is not unique. (Note: This definition is somewhat similar to the definition given
by  Los and Suszko for general consequence operators on an organized sentential
language. But, it does not call for any additional closure conditions.)
Theorem 2.3. Let C be a finite consequence operator defined on nonempty
L and RI∗ the general rules of reference as defined above by C. If C∗ is the finite
consequence operator generated by RI∗, then C∗ = C.
Proof. Recall that for two consequence operators, C′, C′′ defined on L, C′ ≤ C′′
if and only if for each X ∈ P(L), C′(X) ⊂ C′′(X). Indeed, 〈Cf (L),≤〉 is a sublattice
of the lattice 〈C(L),≤〉. For a language L, let RI∗
1
be the rules of inference defined
by a consequence operator C1, where C1 is not necessarily finite. The following is
established by induction on the number of steps in a deduction.
Consider RI∗
1
, where C1 is not necessarily finite. Let X ∈ P(L) and
{b1, . . . , bn}, where all members are always assumed distinct, be an RI
∗
1
-deduction
from X . Then bi ∈ C1(X) for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(1) Let n = 1. Then b1 ∈ X or b1 ∈ R
1. Since, by insertion, X ∪R1 ⊂ C1(X),
then b1 ∈ C1(X).
(2) Consider a deduction {b1, · · · , bn+1} from X and assume the strong in-
duction hypothesis that bi ∈ C1(X) for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then either
bn+1 ∈ X ∪ R
1 or not. If bn+1 ∈ X ∪ R
1, then, as in (1), bn+1 ∈ C1(X). Other-
wise, by definition of logic-system deduction, there exists some Rk+1F (C1) ∈ RI
∗
1
and a (y1, . . . , yk+1) ∈ R
k+1
F (C1) such that nonempty M = {y1, . . . , yk} ⊂
{b1 . . . , bn} ∪X ∪R
1 and bn+1 ∈ C1(M). However, {b1, . . . , bn} ∪X ∪R
1 ⊂ C1(X)
yields that C1(M) ⊂ C1({b1 . . . , bn} ∪ X ∪ R
1) ⊂ C1(C1(X)) = C1(X). Hence,
bn+1 ∈ C1(X) and the result follows by induction.
Now let C∗ be the finite consequence operator generated by the C generated
RI∗, X ∈ P(L), and x ∈ C∗(X). Then, from the definition of C∗, there is an
RI∗-deduction {b1, . . . , bn} from X such that bn = x. Hence, x ∈ C(X). Thus,
C∗ ≤ C.
Conversely, for finite C, let x ∈ C(X). If x ∈ X ∪ R1, where R1 = C(∅),
then x ∈ C∗(X) by insertion. Hence, assume that x /∈ X ∪ R1. Since C is finite,
there is some finite F ⊂ X, of smallest cardinality, such that x ∈ C(F ). The set
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F 6= ∅, since C(∅) = R1. Therefore, m = |F | ≥ 1. Thus, there is an r ∈ Rm+1F
such that pi(r) ∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and pm+1(r) = x and from the definition of C
∗,
x ∈ C∗(F ) ⊂ C∗(X). Thus, C ≤ C∗. Hence, C∗ = C and the proof is complete.
3. Generating logic-systems.
In the physical sciences, the set RI is usually not defined explicitly. In actual
practice, a physical argument simply claims that a specific finite set of statements
- the conclusions - (among other names) is “deduced” from another finite set of
statements S. These statements S can contain members from a fixed set of state-
ments A - a unary relation - where A can be further partitioned. The actual
hypotheses H = S − A. (In formal logic, the A is the entire set of statements
generated by the axioms.) The actual rules of the logic are not usually stated.
It is assumed that after refinements via peer evaluation that the vast majority of
the members of a specific science-community would accept the “derivation.” It is
obvious how one would construct a general RI from collections of such deriva-
tions. For example, let {h1, . . . , hn} ∪ {an+1, . . . , an+k} = S, n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1,
where H = {h1, . . . , hn}, {an+1, . . . , an+k} ⊂ A and {b1, . . . , bm} = B is non-
trivially deduced from S. Then one can construct a Rn+k+1 ∈ RI that contains
{(h1, . . . , hn, an+1, . . . , an+k, x) | x ∈ B}. However, under our definition of how
logic-systems are employed for deduction, many other relations can also generate
each member of B. For example, consider {(h1, . . . , hn, an+1, . . . , an+k, b1)} and
{(b1, x) | x ∈ B}.Since there must be at the least one member in S for there to be
any non-trivial deduction, then, for certain S, it might be discovered that the set
B can be deduced from the set {h1} ∈ H and {a1} ∈ A. Hence, from the definition
of logic-systems and how they are used to generate deductions, you could also have
a 3-ary relation R3 ∈ RI such that {(h1, a1, x) | x ∈ B} ⊂ R
3. Consequently, in
general for non-trivial deduction from premises, it is merely assumed that for any
set X ∈ P(L), if there is nonempty B ∈ P(L), B ∩X = ∅ and each member of B
is claimed to be deduced from finitely many members of X, using finitely members
of a auxiliary set A, then, at the least, there are n-ary relations in RI that con-
tain members that generate the members of B according to the algorithm stated in
Herrmann (2001).
Theorem 2.3 yields an obvious question relative to theorem 3.8 in Herrmann
(2004). Let {RIi} be a nonempty collection of rules of inference, where each RIi is
defined on a nonempty language Li. Let each RIi generate a corresponding finite
consequence operator Ci. If C is the finite consequence operator on
⋃
{Li} generated
by the rules of inference
⋃
{RIi}, is C =
∨
W {Ci}?
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